One expert and trusted Russia watcher I know made the very prescient comment that it all feels very 1980s around Russia at the moment, at least before Russia’s announced pullback of 100,000 forces from Ukraine’s border on April 22.
I assumed the person meant the early ’80s, not the optimistic Mikheil Gorbachev era.
The early ’80s means after the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, and the arms race – remember Greenham Common and the US effort to deploy nuclear cruise missiles in the U.K. to defend against the then perceived to be a greater threat from the Soviet Union. Intense distrust between Washington and Moscow and risk of strategic misstep perhaps with catastrophic consequences.
At that time the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan proved to be a huge strategic blunder by the Soviets. It’s a shame that George W. Bush and Tony Blair failed to learn from their mistake and repeated the exercise in Iraq 24 years later – and the West eventually outspent the Soviets in the arms race because they could and the Soviet-made rusted pins holding the economy together eventually buckled and the rest is history: Mikhail Gorbachev, Boris Yeltsin and eventually Vladimir Putin.
Putin’s arms buildup around Ukraine is, according to US defence officials, the largest Russian military deployment in years, larger even than that seen in 2014 with the annexation of Crimea and then the Russian military intervention in Donbas. Around 100,000 Russian troops have been deployed and Ukrainian officials suggest this could be up to 120,000 in days.
Early in the deployment military types were playing down the risks of war, suggesting that this was more likely sabre rattling, as Putin is now well versed. But something feels different, very different this time around. A few weeks past Russia had already deployed enough military kit for the West to see the glint of Putin’s sabre. But the buildup has continued. Including landing craft painstakingly redeployed from the Caspian to Black Seas. Why the need for such overkill for just a session in sabre-rattling?
Rather the messaging is that this is more than a military exercise or sabre-rattling but something big. Putin may actually be contemplating military action in Ukraine or perhaps elsewhere in the FSU – Belarus perhaps.
I think notable here was just how un-notable Putin’s State of the Nation address was this week. It was really lacking in much content or any big announcements. But perhaps that was meant – the dull script made two things stand out for me. First, Putin’s mention of red lines for Russia is a clear warning to the West not to get involved in Russia’s backyard. Second, Putin’s focus on Russia’s poor demographic trends. Well, how best to easily augment Russia’s population than by annexing yet more territory of bordering nations. And warning the West there not to interfere.
Also notable perhaps is the surprise announcement of a meeting of the Federation Council on Friday this week, the upper body of the Russian parliament which only meets to sign off on big things – like military deployments or like the annexation of Crimea. This suggests something big may be planned for the weekend.
But let’s take a possible Russian military attack on Ukraine, why would Putin contemplate such a high-risk move now?
Indeed, those arguing against would highlight Ukraine’s massive military rebuild since 2014. Ukraine now has several hundred thousand well trained, equipped, motivated and battle-hardened troops protecting its eastern border. They have proven willing and able to fight after seven hard years slog in Donbas, and they have proven a match for their Russian counterparts. Surely they will give Putin’s forces such a bloody nose that he will think twice before committing an attack.
These are all fair points but I would counter that:
First, Russia has long been poor at reading Ukraine.
And still, maybe they think that experiences of Debaltseve, et al., suggest that in a sustained and overwhelming Russian assault that Ukrainian forces would melt. They might think that by deploying overwhelming brute force – as in Belarus and with the opposition in Russia – that populations in Ukraine to Russian can be easily subdued, hence sustaining any “occupation.”
Second, Ukrainian forces have been massively reinforced over recent years but they are stretched over a huge border and now may also face the risk of a second front being opened from the north in Belarus.
Ukraine, meanwhile, still has the tactical disadvantage of not knowing where Russia might strike – Crimea, Donbas, even from the north from Belarus. Their forces risk being stretched and outflanked alongside being outgunned – inevitably Russia will control the skies and seas in any conflict given overwhelming superiority there.
Third, there is still a range of military targets for Putin which could limit Russian casualties and political risks to Putin but they would still give him a political win this side of Duma elections.
These range from a moderate escalation in Donbas, probing to see if Ukrainian forces collapse allowing further territorial conquest in Donbas, to a land bridge to Crimea and then a grab for water resources north of Crimea to assure water supplies for the already annexed peninsula.
But why now?
The first and I think very important point is that for Putin the goal of bringing Ukraine back under Russian strategic control or dominance is long-held and close to his heart (if he has one). He is on record as viewing the collapse of the Soviet Union as the biggest catastrophe of the 20th century. His goal and ambition are to clearly recreate Russian great power status and bringing Ukraine, the cradle of Russian civilisation going back over 1000 years, back under Russian control is clearly central to that. As is Taiwan to China, so is Ukraine to Putin, perhaps more so given the greater historical significance of Ukraine to Russia.
So bringing Ukraine back under the Russian yoke has always been in the long strategic game plan, only Putin’s tactics have changed – perhaps he was willing to play a longer game under Trump and in the early Volodymyr Zelensky years, thinking he could get what he wanted through negotiation and great power summitry.
Putin is a history buff and dates are important – this year marks the 30th anniversary of the collapse of the Soviet Union, with the Belovezha Accords signed on Dec. 8, 1991.
How better to mark its anniversary but with the return of territories in Ukraine and Belarus to Russia?
Second, recent political changes in Kyiv, and the defeat of Donald Trump in last years US elections have reduced the chances of Putin getting what he wants through negotiation. Zelensky has pivoted to the nationalist camp at home by sanctioning Putin’s ally Viktor Medvedchuk and closing pro-Russian TV channels. Zelensky seems unwilling to play to Putin’s fiddle in Minsk 2 peace talks. Meanwhile, Joe Biden might have offered Putin a summit meeting but he knows there is no chance the experienced Biden will offer Putin the spheres of influence he so desires.
So the long game no longer works for Putin, arguably it now works against him as every year that goes by fewer Ukrainians have a memory of their Soviet association with Russia, while the Ukrainian army gets stronger and better able to defend itself.
Third, the West looks the weakest and most divided now than at any time since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The European Union is in disarray on foreign policy and Russia policy in particular as laid bare by the recent disastrous visit of EU foreign policy chief Josep Borrell to Moscow.
The US came out with some tough-looking sanctions this week but Europe was notable in its absence in joining these. Even the U.K. failed to act. Too many EU countries have too many business and vested interests in continuing to deal with Russia to roll out the kind of debilitating sanctions that could make Putin think twice. The US still could though but arguably even Biden is focused on his domestic agenda and the threat from China which is central to the challenges facing the US economy.
But even here perhaps Putin thinks that he has built up Russian macroeconomic balance sheets to such an extent that the Russian economy can now endure the worst sanction that the West can throw at him if he goes into Ukraine and Belarus. But if he waits the ultimately stagnant nature of the Russian economy might make Russia less able to resist sanctions pressure at points in the future.
Meanwhile, NATO is a shadow of its former self – the peace dividend largely spent – and possibly unable to defend itself against a Russian threat let alone come to Ukraine’s help. The U.K. and Germany now have but one-tenth the number of main battle tanks as in 1991 and those remaining are aged Challenger and Leopards.
So just imagine the Western response to the worst-case scenarios of Russian troops on the streets of Kyiv, what would the West do, when it failed to do very much after Budapest 56’, Prague 68’, Kabul 79’ or indeed Crimea 2014. Some harsh words maybe, but no military response and perhaps a few additional sanctions iterations which Putin will think the Russian economy is well able to absorb.
Maybe he thinks the West is just too dependent on Russian energy and too focused on common interests with Russia on nuclear disarmament, climate change, fighting Islamic extremism to do very much if Russia moves back into the near abroad.
So Putin has the vision, he wants to expand Russia’s borders, he sees the opportunity now and perhaps the only real question is the military one – can the Russian military deliver of Putin’s strategic objectives, at what cost, and does Putin deem the risks and costs to be worth it when set against his vision and his desire to make his mark in Russian history.
It feels like the balance has swung in favor of Putin taking actions in Ukraine, Belarus or indeed both, and perhaps elsewhere.
