On Jan. 16, 2021, officially entered in force article 30 of the law on the “protection of the functioning of the Ukrainian language as the official language,” approved by the Verkhovna Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, on April 25, 2019, when Petro Poroshenko was still president.
The article sets a new precedent on the development of language law since 1991. It states that since Jan. 16, every service provider that deals with the public must address its costumers exclusively in Ukrainian, and only after the request of the latter, a different language, common to both parties, can be used. It means that restaurants, bars, supermarkets, banks, bus stations, pharmacies, and so forth, when starting a conversation, must address their clients in Ukrainian.
Violations of such obligation are strictly punishable, ranging from 5,100 to 6,800 hryvnia (approximately 150-200 euros), at least twice the amount of the average pension of a Ukrainian citizen. Further, the fine is addressed towards the owner of the service provider rather than its employees. For instance, in a restaurant, if the waiter addresses the client in Russian, the client can file a complaint and the owner would bear the responsibility for not having so-to-say “invested” in ensuring that its workers communicate in the official language. It should be noted that in order to allow for enough time to adopt to the new legislation, it was given a 16-month window of opportunity to prepare for when article 30 would become operational. Indeed, the law entered in force in September 2019, except for the applicability of article 30.
Poroshenko’s leftovers
It should be noted that the law was approved under the watch of then-President Poroshenko, months before Volodymyr Zelensky took office. One would recall that Poroshenko became president in the aftermath of the EuroMaidan Revolution, which ousted President Viktor Yanukovych, the forcible seizure of Crimea by Russia, and the Donbas conflict led by separatist militias with the support of the Kremlin.
Poroshenko was a fervent nationalist, and during his presidency, he introduced various nationalistic policies that in his imagination and understanding would have strengthened Ukrainian national belonging and identity.
In this regard, worth mentioning is his achievement of the recognition from Constantinople of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church-Kyiv Patriarch (UOC-KP) as the legitimate Ukrainian Church or the adoption of the so-called “Decommunization Laws” introduced to erase Soviet memory from Ukrainian territory.
Policies that were proposed and formulated by various historians and nationalists, amongst them we find Volodymyr Viatrovych, nominated by Poroshenko as the head of the Ukrainian Institute of National Remembrance (UINR). Viatrovych, during his mandate as director of the institute, constantly tried to reinterpret lift from accusation the various actions held by the controversial Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN/UPA), who emerged as a national military movement in the Interwar years seeking independence for Ukraine.
Beyond the language law
While the article seems restrictive and forcible, policies of this weight are not a surprise and rely on a well-established rationale.
Before independence, the Ukrainian language had a lower status than its competitor Russian. Indeed, Soviet leaders and before them the tsars considered the Ukrainian language a mere vernacular one, which was meant to disappear eventually. Further, the language itself became connected to the peasantry, carrying with it a lower status. Even various intellectuals and writers of the nineteenth century with Ukrainian origins, such as Gogol, preferred Russian rather than Ukrainian as their language of communication, arguing that it could attract a wider public. Surprisingly or not, to this day it is far easier to find information in Russian rather than Ukrainian, and many countries and foreign institutions have yet to adopt the correct Ukrainian transliteration for names of various Ukrainian territories and cities.
Therefore, in an attempt to overcome the myth of Ukrainian inferiority and to ensure the proper place the Ukrainian language deserved in the society, various policies were put in place. One could argue that issues of language, together with religion, history, historical memory, and ethnicity are all part of the same basket, that ultimately aims to free itself from the Russian sphere of influence.
Indeed, these problems have increasingly become a political problem rather than an actual one, not always deemed relevant and necessary by the population.
We should not forget the fact that most Ukrainians are bilingual and, due to the interchangeability of Ukrainian and Russian, in the past decades a new form of language developed called surzhyk. Therefore, for the majority of Ukrainians, the two languages are easily interchangeable, often without realizing such phenomenon taking place.
Language: the myth of Ukrainian national unity
On the eve of independence, Ukrainian political elites were met with a country that presented many internal differences, including that of language. Thus, in order to overcome such disparities and so to say ‘purify’ the country by creating a unique national identity, various nationalist and political elites interpreted these differences as endemic challenges to the national cause. As a consequence, an identity style of politics developed politicizing the plurality of the country and creating a concrete internal division.
This process of “Ukrainization” might have been quicker and more efficient (not without consequences) if the country did not lack a strong state system, able to enforce and monitor the implementation of such policies. But, parasitic corruption and the old Soviet party almost immediately secured a place for themselves in the new political structure, paralyzing and even reversing the development of national identity.
As a result, the image of today’s Ukraine is that of a divided country between a pro-European and nationalistic west and an east nostalgic of the Soviet times, volatile and skeptical towards the European Union.
I argue that actually no such divide exists among the population. While there are internal differences (typical of any country), they are not seen as a factor of concern by citizens of Ukraine. For instance, a survey conducted in 2015 revealed that only 10% against 24% of those interviewed believe that language unites Ukrainian people, and only as little as 2% think that political ideologies do unite Ukrainian people.
Therefore, politicians have been constructing ideas and beliefs that transformed these differences in actual political battlegrounds, failing to recognize and realize the multiculturalism present in the country. Ukrainians, both in 2004 and 2013/2014 filled the square of Independence, demanding freedom, justice, dignity, and other civic values. A clear shift from ethnic towards civic nationalism.
What to expect
The consequences of the entry in force of art. 30 of the language law could one more create internal discontent and division, particularly in those regions where both Ukrainian and Russian are widely used. Moreover, it will provide the necessary ammunition for propaganda measures to various pro-Russian parties who are willing to maintain the status quo of the Russian and Ukrainian languages.
Fortunately, it is hard to believe that there are going to be many complaints filed by customers and therefore the issuing of fines.
As I argued above, this is far from being an issue of concern for many Ukrainians especially in a time of economic hardship and the fight against a global pandemic. Ukrainian politicians, including Zelensky, should focus on fulfilling the actual demands of the population. These include: fighting corruption, reforming the judiciary system, introducing the rule of law, and, most importantly, increasing the well-being of the population. Failing to achieve such requests in the next couple of years might for good tear apart the country, which regrets the post-Maidan events, feel betrayed by the political elite, and fails to see a better future for the country.
To conclude, we should not expect much change coming from the effects of the entry into force of article 30, and let us wait to see whether Zelensky will abide with his promise and seek to unify Ukrainians according to their multiculturalism rather than the identity politics of his predecessors.
Vasyl Suchevan is studying for a master’s degree from the University of Trento in Italy.
